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TATSURO FUJIKURA DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
THE RoLE oF CoLLECTIVE IMAGINATION IN THE MAOIST 
CoNFLICT IN NEPAL 
This paper argues that to understand the Maoist mobilization in Nepal, it is necessary to 
probe the manner in which the proj ect of national development has helped engender new 
form s of collective imagination for the people, including the Maoists. l first review the po-
litical history of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and a variety approaches to analyz-
ing the tvlaoist People's 'vVar. l argue that, in addition to macro-political economic analyses 
and inquiries into local hi s tories of domination and res istance, we need to explore th e forms 
of collective imagination that impelled certain forms of ac tion- in thi s case, participation in 
an armed movement with the aim of overtaking the state power. Based on textual and eth -
nographic sources, l show that the proj ects of development in Nepal in the past five decades , 
including such a major undertaking as the creation of a national education system, pro-
vided c rucial conceptual and institutional conditions for the current Maoi st mobili zation. 
Keywords : ~1laoist s , development, youth , revolution , Nepal 
This paper calls for an ethnographic approach to 
the analysis of the Maoist People's 'vVar in Nepal. In 
particular, it is an argument that to understand the 
Maoist mobilization, it is necessary to probe the man-
ner in which the project of national development has 
helped engender new forms of collective imagination 
for the people of Nepal, including the Maoists. There 
are already a growing number of studies about the 
Maoist conflict. Some of these analyze the evolution 
of the ideology and the strategies of the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) as well as the macro-eco-
nomic and social factors that have contributed to 
the emergence of violent conflict. Other studies take 
more ethnographic approaches to the issue. These 
emphasize the long term continuity of local histories 
of exploitation and resistance, and provide us with a 
perspective from which to view the current conflict 
as another instance in a long series of peasant rebel-
lions. The approach that I propose here , however, 
is different from both the political and the ethno-
historical approaches that I have just described. My 
aim is not to refute either economic problems or local 
conflicts as important factors in the current mobili-
zation. I believe they are. What I seek to do, however, · 
is to add another, and I think crucial , dimension 
concerning the role of imagination in shaping forms 
of desire and action. In particular, I argue that we fail 
to understand the historical specificity of the Maoist 
mobilization, if we do not explore the ways in which 
modern discursive forms-particularly, discourses 
of national development and of revolution-have 
helped shape the imaginations, and thereby the ac-
tions, of the participants of the movement. 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MAOIST PEOPLE'S 
WAR 
Since the early years of the People's War, journal-
ists and public intellectuals in Nepal have provided 
invaluable insights into the nature of the conflict 
(Cf. Shrestha 2053 v.s.; Gyawali 1997; Mainali 2055 
v.s.; Sharma 2057 v.s.; Dixit 2002). Deepak Thapa, 
a leading journalist, begins one of his articles on 
the subject with a review of the history of the Ne-
pali communist party and its many fractures (Thapa 
2002; Cf. Thapa 2001) . Thapa traces the history of 
the communist movement in Nepal to the found-
ing of the Communist Party of Nepal in Calcutta 
in 1949. The story moves forward to the time King 
Mahendra seized state power in 1960 and installed 
the Panchayat system, the system of 'basic democ-
racy' he claimed was best suited to Nepali soil. Even 
though the King banned political parties, the 'Rus-
sian Communists' decided to participate in his gov-
ernment, while the 'Chinese Communists' kept their 
distance. Many communist leaders who opposed the 
King were jailed or went into exile as a result. But in 
1974, the more radical members of the communist 
movement succeeded in establishing a new party, 
the Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Congress), 
which asserted as one of its primary demands that 
elections be held to 
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Th is pape r ca ll s for an ethnographic approach to the ana ly-
si of the Maoist People's War in Nepa l. ln particular, it is 
an argument that to understand the Maoist mobilization, 
it is necessa ry to probe the manner in which the project of 
nat ional development has helped engender new forms of col-
lect ive imagination for the people of Nepal, including the 
Maoists. There are already a growing number of studies about 
-the Maoist conflict. Some of these analyze the evolution of the 
ideology and the strategies of the Com-
munist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as well 
as the macro-economic and social fac-
tors that have contributed to the emer-
gence of violent conflict. Other studies 
take more ethnographic approaches to 
the issue. These emphasize the long 
term continuity of local histories of 
exploitation and resistance, and pro-
vide us with a perspective from which 
to view the current conflict as another 
instance in a long series of peasant re-
bellions. The approach that I propose 
here , however, is different from both 
the political and the ethno-historical 
approaches that I have just described. 
My aim is not to refute either economic 
problems or local conflicts as impor-
tant factors in the current mobiliza-
tion. I believe they are. What I seek to 
do, however, is to add another, and I 
think crucial, dimension concerning 
the role of imagination in shaping forms of desire and action. 
In particular, I argue that we fail to understand the historical 
specificity of the Maoist mobilization , if we do not explore 
the ways in which modern discursive forms-particularly, 
discourses of national development and of revolution-have 
helped shape the imaginations, and thereby the actions, of 
the participants of the movement. 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MAOIST PEOPLE'S WAR 
Since the early years of the People's War, journalists and 
public intellectuals in Nepal have provided invaluable in-
sights into the nature of the conflict (Cf. Shrestha 2053 v.s.; 
Gyawali 1997; :tvlainali 2055 v.s.; Sharma 2057 v.s.; Dixit 
2002). Deepak Thapa, a leading journalist, begins one of his 
art icles on the subject with a review of the histm~y of the Ne-
pali communist party and its many fractures (Thapa 2002; 
Cf. Thapa 2001). Thapa traces the history of the communist 
movement in Nepal to the founding of the Communist Party 
of Nepal in Calcutta in 1949. The story moves forward to the 
time King Mahendra seized state po\ver in 1960 and installed 
the Panchayat system, the system of 'basic democracy' he 
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claimed was best suited to Nepali soil. Even though the King 
banned political parties, the 'Russian Communists' decided 
to .participate in his government, while the 'Chinese Com-
munists' kept their distance . Many communist leaders who 
opposed the King vve re jailed or went into exile as a result. 
But in 1974, the more radical members of the communist 
movement succeeded in establishing a new party, the Com-
munist Party of Nepal (Fourth Congress), which asserted as 
one of its primary demands that elec-
tions be held to constitute an assembly 
to prepare a new constitution for the 
country. In addition, this party worked 
to become a popular movement, which 
vvas to be turned into an armed strug-
gle at the opportune moment. There 
were further splits within this radical 
faction in the following years. But af-
ter the restoration of the multi-party 
parliamentary system in 1990, some 
of the splinter groups joined together 
and took part in the general election 
under the name , United People's Front 
(UPF). The UPF goal was to win in the 
election so as to hasten the end of the 
parliamentary system 'from within.' 
After the election , the UPF emerged as 
the third largest force in parliament2 
Yet a further split divided the UPF in 
PHOTO: TATSURO FUJIKURA tWO, With One half taking part in the 
mid-term election of 1994, and the 
other boycotting it. The faction that boycotted the election 
became the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in 1995, and 
in the same year developed the strategy for a people's war de-
signed to encircle the city from the countryside. This 'People's 
War' began on February 13, 1996, when the CPN (Maoist) 
simultaneously attacked police posts, Agricultural Develop-
ment Banks, and Small Farmers Development Project offices 
in the Sindhuli , Rolpa, Rukum, and Gorkha Districts (Thapa 
2002: 77-82; INSEC 1999 : 123-126) 3 
Thus, in Thapa's article, the Maoist People's War is seen 
to emerge out of ideological and practical struggles within 
the Communist Party itself. The ideological struggles iden-
tified include debates about whether the revolution should 
be brought about through a popular movement or through 
armed struggle, or whether the parliamentary system should 
be used or boycotted. The practical struggles singled out in-
clude contingent events, such as the failure of one fact ion of 
the UPF to receive the appropriate election symbol from the 
election commission, which resulted in their being effectively 
blocked from participating in the mid-term elect ion of 1994 
and ultimately drifting further away from mainstream parlia-
mentary politics. 
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Among the practical struggles and contingent events criti-
cally important to this discussion are the violent tactics ·used 
by competing political parties against each other after the res-
toration of multiparty democracy system (Thapa 2002: 82-85; 
Cf. Thapa 2001: 8-10). Use of violence among rival parties 
was often reciprocal, but after one of the parties won con-
trol of the government, competition became radically asym-
metrical , as the ruling party could and did employ police and 
other state machinery against its rivals. Indeed, Thapa quotes 
Amik Sherchan, a leader of the United People's Front as say-
ing "If it hadn't been for Girija Prasad Koirala and Khum 
Bahadur Khadka, there would perhaps have been no Maoist 
war" (Thapa 2002: 84). Koirala is a senior leader of the Ne-
pali Congress Party who served four times as Prime Minister 
of Nepal between 1991 and 2001. Khum Bahadur Khadka, 
serving as Home Minister in a Congress government in 1995, 
directed suppressive operations (code-named 'Operation Ro-
meo') against opposition political party activists in the Rolpa 
District. The Human Rights Year Book 1995 describes the 
operations in the following manner: 
The government initiated ... suppressive operations to a de-
gree of state terror. Especially, the workers of United People's 
Front were brutally suppressed. Under the direct leadership 
of ruling party workers of the locality, police searched, tor-
tured and arrested, without arrest warrants, in eleven villages 
of the district. Nearly 6,000 locals had left the villagers [sic] 
clue to the police operation. One hundred and thirty people 
were arrested without serving any warrants. Among the ar-
rested included elderly people above 75 years of age. All the 
detained were subjected to torture. Seven innocent women 
were forcibly undressed and tortured pouring water and si-
multaneously beating in genitals by nettle (INSEC 1996: 12). 
In addition to presenting a history of political parties, Tha-
pa and other commentators (e.g. Sharma 2057 v.s.; Gyawali 
2002; Mikesell1993, 2001; Maina li 2055 v.s) also discuss the 
more general political, economic, and social circumstances in 
Nepal. They write about the absence of substantive democ-
racy, about the prevalence of poverty and unemployment , 
about the significance of the urban-rural divide, and about 
the importance of ethnic and caste discrimination. All are 
seen as contributing factors to the Maoist mobilization. And 
they generally end their analyses with an examination of vari-
ous scenarios for the future, including their own prescriptive 
statements about how the conflict should be resolved. For ex-
ample, Thapa suggests sincere political dialogue rather than 
military force as a solution (Thapa 2002: 94-98). · 
Although I find much about this manner of presentation 
and analysis significant and indeed indispensable, I also agree 
\~'ith the demand for a more ethnographic approach, one that 
explores specific local experiences and mobilizations as inte-
gral part of thi s conflict (cf. Shneiderman, this volume). Such 
an approach probes the specific local context: it investigates 
local memories and motivations that are embedded in the 
texture of the everyday life. Fundamentally (and following 
the example of anthropologists concerned with con flict and 
violence in other parts of the world), such an approach does 
not regard the current conflict as simply imposed from 'above' 
or 'outside' on an otherwise 'peaceful' rural life. It attempts 
to discover how "the form and content of the extraordinary 
is deeply embedded in the history of the everyday, while it 
nevertheless also stands outside the everyday" (Pracleep jag-
arnathan, as quoted in Menon and Bashin 1998: 60). 
To understand the Maoist mobilization, therefore, we must 
explore the "quiet prehistory" of violent conflicts (Scott 1992: 
63) in Nepal. Such an exploration will reveal, I trust, that the 
current Maoist mobilization is to a large degree , a matter of 
continuity: that violence, and even violent deaths , have long 
been a part of rural life. But, it will also reveal dimensions of 
rupture: that in the collective consciousness of the partici-
pants , when a Maoist dies in this conflict, s/he is seen as a 
martyr for the causes of the nation and the revolution-that 
is, for imagined communities beyond the horizons of village 
and the local relations of exploitation. Thus, I would like to 
shift the emphasis in jagarnathan's formulation and suggest 
that we need to explore how the extraordinary, even while it 
is embedded in the everyday, nevertheless "stands outside the 
everyday" and remains, indeed, extraordinary. 
One of the most obvious reasons to acknowledge the fact 
of rupture is because, from the point of view of the Maoists, 
their movement is revolutionary movement. Their vision and 
intent is to bring about fundamental change, a radical break 
in the continuity of history: they want to destroy the old sys-
tem, and institute a new one. Another reason to acknowledge 
that the current mobilization is extraordinary involves its 
excessive violence, an excessiveness that, I would suggest, is 
partly connected to the mobilization's revolutionary vision. 
Finally, we must acknowledge that the current mobilization is 
extraordinary because it grows out of a rupture that preceded 
it by several decades. This is the rupture of modernity, which 
was brought into rural Nepal in large part through various 
development interventions beginning in the 1950s. I want to 
explore this last point in the next section. 
PROJECT OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE 'YOUTH' 
I lived in Salyan District in the mid-western hills of Nepal 
between 1997 and 1999. Although 1 have returned there a 
couple of times for brief visits, most of what 1 write here are 
based on my observation up to 1999. The conflict has ex-
panded especially since 26 November 2001, when the Mao-
ists attacked the Royal Nepalese Army and the government 
was forced to declare a state of emergency4 The conflict has 
spread throughout the country, and foreign governments 
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including the United States are nm.v more actively involved. 
Hence, it is important to emphasize that what I write below 
refers mainly to an earlier phase of the conflict. In this earlier 
phase, most of the people I knevv well in Salyan were highly 
ambivalent about the NCP (Maoist)'s People's War. They did 
not support the Maoists, but they did not support the govern-
ment either. Instead, they felt "caught in between," as judy 
Pettigrew has described (Pettigrew, this volume). Yet, at least 
in the area in Salyan where !lived, people were still able most 
of the time to keep both the Maoist and government forces at 
arm's length and maintain the position of neutrality. Yet, with 
the escalation of the conflict, there are many signs that the 
space of neutrality is being eroded, as ever more people are 
"caught in between" and tortured or killed by either Maoist 
and government forces (Cf. Pettigrew, this volume). A large 
number of people have had to 
leave their villages to take refuge 
elsewhere in Nepal or abroad. 
journalists and human rights 
activists are continuing their ef-
forts of documenting the crimes 
perpetrated by both sides. 5 Here, 
however, in discussing the rela-
tionship between development 
interventions and the contem-
porary crisis, 1 will focus on the 
earlier phase of the conflict, and 
on those villagers who supported 
the Maoist movement. 
Commenting on such an argument, a Maoist in Sa lyan sa id: 
"If unemployment was the reason, iL would have made us not 
Maobadis (lviaoists), but jagiri-badis (Employment-ists)." I 
interpret her meaning to be that the movement was not sim-
ply a mechanical response Lo an economic problem, or an 
expression of frustration in the face of individual deprivation. 
The act of joining the movement was not simply a reaction to 
personal grievances in the past or present, but rather a com-
mitment, pledge, and dedication to bring about a particular 
form of a collective future . 
A closer look at the problem of education might clarify 
matters. Stephen Mikesell's 1993 article on the possibility of 
a Maoist 'people's war' in Nepal contained a concise, and I 
think very accurate, statement of the problems of the national 
education system in Nepal. He wrote : 
At least since the early 1990s, 
analysts have linked Maoist mo-
bilization to the problems of de-
velopment, or more specifically, 
to the problems caused by 'failed 
development.' These analysts 
PHOTO: TATSURO FUJIKURA 
Bonded laborers from western Nepal marching to demand their 
freedom. 
Nepali education simultane-
ously prepares the students for 
bureaucratic and managerial 
jobs and disqualifies most of 
them from these jobs. . . . It is 
... an imposition onto the vil-
lage communities of an alien 
system of knowledge, prioriti es, 
values and methods evolved 
from \Vestern colleges of edu-
cation. Classroom discipline , 
examinations and certification 
authoritatively determine what 
is "true knowledge," and de-
value the knowledge, practices 
and languages of the villagers. 
... An immense class of people 
is presently being schooled in 
suggest that Nepal's failure to develop as a nation-state is the 
main cause for the rise of the Maoist movement. They argue 
that the officials who are responsible for running the Nepali 
state have failed to provide the means for individuals and the 
nation as a whole to move in an improving direction. Maoism, 
they believe, is a symptom of inadequate management and 
coordination, of a lack of the 'good governance' that vvould 
have enabled Nepal and its people to mature. 
An example of this position is an oft-repeated claim that 
the lack of employment opportunities for a "growing body of 
semi-educated youth" (Nickson 1992: 383) in rural areas was 
a main cause for the rise of Maoist movement 6 Schooling, so 
the argument goes, has raised the expectations of youth by 
making them aware of the possibilities of a better life . Yet, the 
state has failed to provide these youth with jobs that would 
have enabled them to achieve that better life . 
Nepal to despise their own ru-
ral background (lvlikesell1993: 32) . 
I fully agree with Mikesell 's observation that national edu-
cation has been alien and alienating. But , I would also argue 
that we need to explore how this alienating education may 
have nonetheless helped foster distinctive visions, aspira-
tions, dispositions, and capacities in village youth. One of the 
explicit intentions of the Nepali education system was to fos-
ter in youth an attachment to the Nepali nation. The history 
textbooks spoke of the brave Nepalis who unified the nation 
and heroically defended it against the British (Onta 1996). In 
fact, the textbooks were framed as exhortations of youth to 
become the kinds of people who were able to lead the nation 
in its path towards progress (Ahearn 2001) In other words, 
a major purpose of education was to enlist the youth into the 
state-sponsored project of collectively imagining a develop-
ing nation. I argue that Maoist discourse built on the themes 
developed by the nationalist education system but rearranged 
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the themes in order to produce an alternative vision. Although 
the national development discourse and the lvlaoist discoi.trse 
are indeed different, since the latter built on the former, the 
lat ter makes sense to many of the rural youth because of their 
prior education in the former. Let me elaborate on this f unher 
by way of discussing my observations from Salyan. 
Among the people who joined the Maoist movement in 
Sa lyan, many did indeed have around ten years of form al 
education. According to the stories that l heard , however, 
schooling was not something that was 'imposed' by the state. 
Local resources were mobilized and, during the 1960's and 
'70's, loca l people, many of whom were P,t[aga rs or Matwali 
Chetris 7, took the initiative in establi shing schools in their 
own villages. ln the beginning only boys went to school. But 
many local leaders insisted that girls should be sent to school 
too. One story has it that , in the 1970's, a Pradhan Panch ('v il-
lage chairman') sent his daughter to school, but soon realized 
th at she felt quite uncomfortable being the only girl there. So, 
he imposed a fine on each household which did not send its 
daughters to school. In some villages, girls who finished tenth 
grade and passed the SLC8 exams vvere immediately given 
teaching positions in local schools so as to prove to the village 
people , by way of concrete example, that there were benefits 
to sending daughters to school. 
For many of these women, going to school was more than a 
means of achieving some purely personal or private goal. This 
was so because these women, as I have sa id , were examples. 
They were examples to other girl s, and they were examples to 
the entire village and beyond. And, being an example meant , 
first of all, being for others, being beyond the self. I underline 
this point , first of all, to argue against the kinds of analyses 
that reduce the problem of motive to a matter of personal in-
terest. However, I should also note that , for the past several 
decades in Nepal, the project of national development aggres-
sively promoted a view that it was necessa ry to have a formal 
education in order to become a kind of person who could help 
others (Gautam 2051 v.s.), and that , as an educated person , 
the primary way to help others was through helping to de-
velop the nation (Skinner and Holland 1996). 
As I have mentioned above, the :tvlaoists critici ze state-
sponsored nationalism . Yet , they share a basic assumption 
with the official nationalism in that they too posit a 'Nepali 
nation' as a taken-for-granted object of attachment and the 
ground for all political action. A Maoist 'revolutionary song' 
entitled "The Revolutionaries ," begins with the following 
words: "Revolutionaries, liberate Nepal! I Come, the people 
are calling I Come out at once, come out I Come out, ca rry-
ing guns" (Gautam 2055 v.s.: 3; my translation). As we can 
see, the object to be liberated by the Maoi st revolutionaries is 
'Nepal '. Another song, entitled "\Vake up and rise, Oh Youth ," 
begins as follows: 
Wake up and rise, oh youtb, carrying torches 
Growing brave like Hi mal , turning into a wall of rock 
Today on our upper arms depends the fortune of the nation 
Today in our heartbeats is the love for the nat ion 
If we are timid now the nation will sink 
If we are conscious now the nation will be bu ilt 
Wake up and rise, oh youth, carrying sickles 
Becoming stars equipped with hammers 
(Gautam 2055 v.s.: 13; my translation) 
This revolutionary song exhorts the youth , just as the 
school textbooks do , to become conscious and active builders 
of the nation, although unlike the textbooks, the song calls 
for armed struggle as a means of nation-building. 
The statement issued by the Nepal Communist Party (Mao-
ist) on the day it launched the People's War, indeed, began 
with a criticism of the Nepali state for failing to develop the 
nation: "The current rulers of Nepal, speaking tirelessly about 
development and nation-building for 50 years [in fact] 
have led Nepal to become one of the world 's poorest nations, 
second only to Ethiopia" (Quoted in Nepa l Rastriya Budwijivi 
Sanga than 2054 v.s.: 45; my translation). The Maoists declare 
that it is no\v time to overthrow the "comprador and bureau-
cratic capitalist classes" (ibid.) which have ruled Nepal and 
led it into its current economic, political and cultural crisis. 
Thus, the Maoists' declaration of war attempts to de-legitima-
tize the current regime by pointing out its failure to develop 
Nepal, and attempts to present its members as the legitimate 
rulers, the true representatives of the people and the real 
agents of development. 
Another story from Salyan will help make my case about 
the relationship between development andlvlaoist discourses. 
The 1vlaoists' concrete programs for social change included 
a campaign to ban alcohol , or 'raksi bandh'. In the area of 
Salyan where I lived , the raksi bandh campaign encouraged 
by the Maoists began around 1998. Both Maoists and non-
lvlaoist women- including those women who were otherwise 
strongly opposed to the Maoists' violent tactics- participated 
actively in this campaign. Raksi-bandh committees con-
sisting exclusively of women were formed in many villages 
and neighborhoods to impose fines on those making and/or 
consuming alcohol. In some neighborhoods, simply asking 
where one could obtain alcohol was a crime punishable by a 
fine of 50 rupees . \i\lhen men in a village commented that the 
women were involved in raksi-bandh committees simply be-
cause they were told to do so by members of the UPF, all the 
women present objected . They countered that they wanted to 
ban alcohol, not because any Party told them to do so, but for 
their own sakes. It was, they said, 'the women' who wanted 
to ban alcohol. They were the ones who bore the economic 
consequences of the over-consumption of alcohol and suffer 
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the harassment and violence from drunken men. It was 'the 
women' who wanted the reform so as to improve the villages 
that have been plagued by alcohol. 
Interestingly, at the same time as the Maoist-encouraged 
raksi-bandh campaigns were being carried out in the vil-
lages, there also was an anti-alcohol campaign funded by the 
Asia Foundation going on around Salyan's bazaar area. The 
Asia Foundation is a California based non-profit organiza-
tion which described its 
and also in the manner in which they learned such ex tra-
curricular skills as dancing. Even if they were not lvlaoists, a 
blacksmith abused by his patron or a student's parent upset 
about a teacher who did not show up in school could say: 
"What would the Maoists do if they heard about this7" ln 
many areas, the Maoists appeared to be involved in 'making 
things right' - making things work the way they were sup-
posed to ·work within a modern, developmentalist Nepali na-
tion-state. The threat of violence produced their remarkable 
effectiveness. 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND 
THE 'NECESSITY OF 
VIOLENCE' 
objectives in a pamphlet 
distributed in Kathmandu 
in the late 1990s, as the 
'promotion of democracy 
and a market-oriented 
economy'. According to the 
Asia Foundation's program 
officer, their anti-alcohol 
campaign emerged out of 
their women's empower-
ment program. The Asia 
Foundation had provided 
funding for organizing 
'women's groups' around 
the bazaar and encouraged 
them to make a list of the 
problems in their com-
munities that they wanted 
to solve. The problem of 
drinking emerged at the 
top of the list . Accordingly, 
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Freed bonded laborers camping near an administrative building in Bardiya. 
This leads us to the prob-
lem of violence. After the 
initiation of the People's 
\Nar, many commentators 
expressed shock at the fact 
that Nepal - the 'zone of 
peace', the birth place of 
Lord Buddha, populated 
by a friendly and peace-
loving people - could so 
quickly plunge into a state 
of civil war (Cf. Panday 
1999: 10-12). The Maoists 
however offered a different 
interpretation of the nature 
and history of the Nepalis. 
the Asia Foundation provided further funding for women to 
organize a rally in the bazaar against drinking. As far as I 
could tell, nothing changed after the rally until, a few months 
later, Maoists appeared at a bazaar shop one night with petrol 
bombs. They told the shop owner to stop selling alcohol, and 
destroyed all of the liquor he had in stock. Sales of alcohol 
in the bazaar stopped (at least in public) the very next day. 
This episode was interpreted by many living in the area as an 
example of the Maoists' determination and ability to produce 
real changes in society, in contrast to that of other political 
parties or development-aid organizations. It was also clear to 
all that the effectiveness of the Maoists derived in large part 
from their use of force . 
There were many other causes that the Maoists advocated 
and initiated, during the early years of the Maoist war (ca. 
1996-99) that many non-Maoists approved of. There was 
in general less government corruption and usury where the 
Maoists were strong. Dalits9 had less fear of being beaten-up 
by members of higher castes. Public servants were compelled 
to go to their offices and actually do their work. There was 
more discipline in Maoist-dominated schools. Discipline was 
evident both in the way students studied in their classrooms 
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Their document entitled "Strategy and Tactics of Armed 
Struggle in Nepal," adopted by the Third Plenum of the 
Central Committee of the CPN (Maoist) in 1995, contained 
the follovving assertions: 
l. The reactionary propaganda that the Nepalese people 
are peace-loving and that they don't like violence is absolutely 
false. It is an incontrovertible fact that the Nepalese people 
have been waging violent struggle for their rights since the 
historical times. 
2. Till today vvhatever general reforms have been achieved 
by the Nepalese people, behind them there was the force of 
violent and illegal struggle of the people. 
The document goes on to argue that "Today, the greatest 
responsibility has fallen upon the revolutionaries to initiate 
armed struggle against feudalism & imperialism and com-
plete the New Democratic revolution by representing that 
great historical legacy [of the violent struggles by the Nepali 
people]" (CPN [J:vlaoist]: 1995). Hence, the Maoists challenged 
the image of peace-loving Nepalis with a narrative of a violent 
history which asserted the Nepali capacity for, and necessity 
to, engage in violent struggle for social transformation. 
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Here, it is important to observe that this document does 
not repudiate the official Nepali history in its entirety. While 
iL refutes peace and harmony as the central characteristics 
of Nepa li soc iety, it affirms and utilizes another motif in the 
offic ial history, namely that of 'Nepali braveness' (C f. Onta 
1996). Hence, it claims that the Nepali people are fervent na-
tionali sts who "feel proud to lay clown their lives while fi ght-
ing t'ather than submit to the pressures of the foreigners" and 
"are the great warriors in the world " (CPN [Maoist]: 1995). 
Therefore, the Maoist discourse, rather than simply replacing 
the official discourse, builds on and rearranges the themes 
developed by the latter, including those of nationalism and 
progress . The key ideological task in this rearrangement is 
to construct a narrative that conveys the absolute necessity 
of revolutionary violence to achieving the progress that the 
Nepali State promised but never delivered . 
In Salyan District, Maoists not only used violence, but of-
ten after committing a violent act advertised it in newspapers 
and newsletters as well as during cultural programs, where 
they skillfully re-enacted the torture and murder of a 'class 
enemy'. For instance, after one such murder of a 'class enemy' 
in early 1997, the Maoists summoned the local people to a 
cultural program in ·which they re-enacted how they dragged 
him outside of hi s house and cut-off his limbs, little by little. 
They repeated this program in several different villages. The 
purpose of these 'propaganda activities', I believe, was to con-
vince the villagers of the necessity and efficacy of revolution-
ary violence. 'vVhat the Maoists aimed to convey was it was 
only Maoist violence that could eliminate the local 'exploiter' 
whose power derived in part from his close connection with 
state power. Through such skillful re-enactments, the Maoists 
undoubtedly aimed to communicate that they were capable of 
extreme and hence awe-inspiring violence - ca lculated use of 
brutality that they hoped made them appear more formid able 
and effective than their enemy (the Nepali-state) or other self-
proclaimed agents of social change (such as NGOs). 10 
The following episode concerning the Dasain 11 festival 
contains an example of the kind of narrative constr uction 
which attempted to produce a vi sion of a radical antagonism 
between the Nepali state and the Nepali people that neces-
sitated revolutionary violence. During the Dasain season , I 
was listening to Radio Nepal with a couple of Maoist party 
workers. A Radio Nepal announcer was explaining the tradi-
tions involved in Dasain, repeatedly stating that Dasain as a 
whole vvas a celebration of the victory of 'Truth ' over darkness 
and evil. We were li stening quietly. At the very end of the 
program , in his last sentence, the announcer explained that 
Dasain was traditionally celebrated to commemorate Gocl-
·cless Durga's triumph over Demons. The Maoist workers took 
a deep breath and said , "Truth over Evil." To the Maoist lis-
teners, thus, what the Radio Nepal announcer repeatedly re-
ferred to as a celebration of the triumph of truth over evil was 
really a celebration of the subjugation of the non-Hindus by 
the Hindu Nepali state. They viewed the Demons referred to 
in the epic story as the rea l people of Nepa l, and the Goddess 
as an incarnation of the monstrous rulers of Nepal. The Mao-
ist ve rsion of Dasain was constructed as a secret (and hence 
true) history hidden behind the official pronouncements by 
the Nepali state. The secret history revealed the deceptive and 
monstrous nature of the Nepali state, and prodded the Nepali 
people to wake up and fight against its monstrousness. 
The secret history of Dasain just described is in fact a ver-
sion of counter-narratives told by ethnic-activists in many 
corners of Nepal (Cf. Hangen 2001). On many occasions, I 
listened to articulate Magars in Salyan engage in lengthy de-
bates about whether Nepali society was essentially a 'caste-so-
ciety' or 'class-society'. Magars committed to ethnic activism 
would emphasize caste as the dominant structuring principle 
of Nepali society. Others, including Magar Maoists, would 
argue that class was the ultimate determinant, while caste 
ideology served the interests of the dominant class which 
consisted mainly of high-caste Hindus. Again the crux of the 
Maoists' ideological work was to construct a narrative that 
subsumed ethnic counter-narratives as well as other opposi-
tional narratives - including those of women , dalits, the poor, 
the landless, and small farmers - and to present revolutionary 
war as the only true remedy for all forms of oppression (C f. 
Pahari 2003). 
Maoist narratives constructed the current Nepali State 
as a monstrous instrument of oppression in the hands of a 
small mino rity of feudal and bureaucratic-capitalist classes . 
Given such a monstrous state, Maoists argued , only violence 
of spectacular proportion was sufficient to defeat it and to 
set things right . And violence, they thought , was necessary 
'now'. While visiting Salyan during the 1999 parliamentary 
election campaign, the leader of Communist Party of Nepal 
(J:vlarxist-Leninist) , Bam Dev Gautam , said that his party was 
in almost total agreement with the CPN (Maoist) except that 
his members thought the situation not yet right for an armed 
struggle. Local Maoists who heard these words commented 
that , for people like Bam Dev, the 'right time' would never 
come, and the future would be indefinitely postponed. The 
Maoists, in contrast, were committed to making necessary 
changes immediately (or at least within 5 years, as they used 
to say around 1998). Becoming a Maoist, for them , entailed 
abandoning the endless chain of calculation and analysis that 
they saw as postponing radica l transformation. Their call was 
for a leap into destructive/creative action . 
The local Maoists' view I just described strikingly mirrors 
what Prachanda, the General Secretary (at the time) 12 of the 
CPN (Maoist), told the interviewer, Li Onesto, in the spring of 
1999 : "The real process of development is breaking with con-
tinuation and making a rupture. Everything in n ature, in hu-
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man history and society ... is the process of breaking through 
with continuation .... 'vVe condemn all the revisionist cliques 
as vulgar evolutionarism. \Ve are revolutionary, and revolu-
tion means breaking with continuation and the question of 
making leaps" (li Onesto 2000). Both the local Maoists and 
Prachanda, then, embraced rupture . 
There could be several ways of interpreting the concur-
. renee between Prachanda and the .tvlaoists in Salyan villages 
concerning the necessity of rupture. The concurrence could 
derive from the effectiveness of Maoist Party indoctrination, 
reaching from its top to its 'bottom' in the villages. lt could 
also be interpreted as a case of opportunism, with villagers 
strategically 'adopting' the Maoist position because it served 
their own pragmatic (and not necessarily revolutionary) 
for the current .tvlaoist mobilization. 
lam not trying to claim that the 'lack' of development was 
a cause of the Maoist war. Nor am l trying to establish that 
' incomplete' or 'uncoordinated' development was responsible. 
Rather l am urging that we attend to the radical transforma-
tion of the conceptual and institutional field that development 
interventions created, a transformation that has reshaped the 
field of political possibilities. The collective imagination of 
the People's War has emerged and gained its force within this 
field of reshaped possibilities. The Maoists have promoted a 
vision in vvhich the armed revolution appears as an inevitable 
step forward, given the monstrous Nepali state that was im-
peding true (and inevitable) progress. 
Understanding why their vision might appeal to some, 
interests. l would like to propose an 
alternative interpretation, one more in 
accordance with what the local 1vlaoist 
cadre l quoted earlier meant when she 
said Maobadis (Maoists) were not Jagiri-
badis (Employment-ists). The interpreta-
tion l would propose is that Prachanda 
and the local Maoists concurred because 
they were participants in the same col-
lective imagination. Becoming a Maoist, 
at least for the local Maoist cadre 1 quot-
ed and others like her, was not simply 
a means to pursue personal interests. lt 
entailed, rather, a commitment to , and 
participation in, a particular - revolu-
tionary - way of envisioning the world, 
a vision that propelled one toward a 
particular form of action. Key features 
of that vision , as we have seen, included 
.------ ---------. ...... ......- _, or even to many Nepalis does not, of 
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the absolute imperatives of progress and Bonded laborers during Kathmandu victory 
course, mean that we have to agree 
with it . The task for those of us who do 
not agree with CPN (Maoist)'s violent 
politics include, I would argue, ex-
plorations of other forms of collective 
imagination about social transforma-
tion that are non-violent but equally 
compelling and effective. 1 have in 
mind, for example, local organizations 
and networks that have mobilized for 
the liberation of bonded agricultural 
laborers, the 'Kamaiyas', in western Ne-
pal. Their mobilization, independent of 
any political parties, forced the Nepali 
government to declare the 'emancipa-
tion' of tens of thousands of bonded 
laborers and thereby introduced major 
changes in class relations in the western 
plains. The movement is continuing, 
as a large number of 'liberated' labor-improvement, necessity of a radical rap- rally after the declaration of emancipation by 
ture with the past in order to bring about government. 
ers are still demanding government to 
provide them with land to live on and cultivate. As with the 
Maoists, we cannot understand this mobilization without 
reference to transformations brought forward in rural west-
authentic progress, a group of educated 
'youth' as those privileged to bring about that change, and the 
Nepali nation as both the object and ground for real develop-
ment.13 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, 1 argued that, in addition to macro-political 
economic analyses and inquiries into local histories of domi-
nation and resistance, we need to explore the forms of col-
lective imagination that impelled certain forms of action- in 
this case, participation in an armed movement with the aim 
of overtaking the state power. In historical terms, 1 showed 
that the project of development in Nepal , including such a 
major undertaking as the creation of a national education sys-
tem, provided crucial conceptual and institutional conditions 
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ern Nepal through developmer.t interventions (See Fujikura 
200la, 200lb). However, unlike the Maoists, those who mo-
bilized for Kamaiya liberation did not aim to take over state 
power and used methods that were decidedly non-violent. 
Rather than aiming at the violent purification of the nation, 
the movement demanded, and is still demanding, that the 
Nepali state make good on its promises of development , of 
upholding constitution, of basing its legitimacy on being able 
to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens. At the same 
time, the movement's demands are based on universal prin-
ciples- those of human rights- that are not contingent on the 
policies of any particular state. Correspondingly, the network 
that supports the movement crosses state boundaries. In con-
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trast to the l:Vlaoists' violent politics , we could characterize the 
Kama iya movement as a "politics of patience ." Arjun Appadu-
rai (2002) used this term to designate a form of socio-political 
engagen1ent that values negotiation and coalition building, 
one that acknowledges that positive social transformations 
take long time to materiali ze . The politics of patience, Appad-
urai writes, is "constructed against the tyranny of emergency" 
- the emergency experienced everyday by people suffering 
from pove rty and exploitation (Appadurai 2002:30). Those 
bonded laborers who struggled for their own liberation and 
who, since the 'emancipation,' have endured without their 
own land or housing, have NOT joined the Maoists, but have 
been patiently working to make their society, the Nepali gov-
ernment , and international community live up to their own 
promises, promises of civility and of equality. These laborers 
provide a remarkable example of the politics of patience. And 
they provide an alternative vision to those, on either side of 
the current conflict, who see violence as its only solution. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 This is a revised version of the paper I presented at the "War on 
Terrorism, 'vVar as Terrorism" Conference at Madison, Vvisconsin, 
on October 10, 2002. Revisions were made in part in response to 
general discussion and specific comments offered during the con-
ference. Special thanks to Deborah Gewertz, Genevieve Lakier, and 
john Metz for their helpful suggestions and criticisms through the 
course of revisions. 
2 The Nepali Congress won 110 seats, the Communist Party of 
Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) won 69, and the United People's 
Front won 9. 
3 In addition, members of the party also attacked a distillery in 
Gorkha , and hurled a petrol bomb at the Pepsi-Cola factory in Kath-
mandu (Nepal Rastriya Buddhijibi Sangathan 2054 v.s.: 25-26). 
4 According to INSEC's count, the number of people killed in 
connection with the People's War between 13 February 1996 and 25 
November 2001 was 1803 (993 killed by the government; 810 killed 
by the Maoists). In contrast, the death toll between 26 November 
2001 and 8 June 2002 was 3167 (2552 killed by the government, 
615 killed by the Maoists) bringing the total death toll from the 
conflic t (by 8 june 2002) to 4970 (INSEC 2002). There are many 
reports that suggest that the Maoists, in the frontline areas, have 
intensified their coercive tactics forcing labor and forcing recruit-
30 
ment of villagers into their military force. As a consequence, many 
villagers, espec ially youth, have fled from their homes into India or 
elsewhere. 
5 See, for example, the website maintained by Amnesty Inter-
national 's Nepa l Section: hup://www.amnestynepal.org/ See, also, 
Dixit 2002. 
6 See Nickson (1992). His argument has been quoted approvingly 
by Mainali (2055 v.s.) Sharma (2057 v.s.) and Thapa (2002) 
7 Magars are considered an ethnic group, while lvlatwali Chetris 
are considered a caste group. In terms of an encompassing caste 
hierarchy, they are both located around the middle of the scale, be-
low the 'sacred-thread-wearing' castes of Brahmans, Thakuris and 
Tagadhari Chetris which have dominated the highest echelons of 
social and political power. 
8 This acronym refers to School Leaving Certificate exams, taken 
after ten years of formal education. The passing of the SLC exams is 
a minimum qualification for many government jobs. 
9 
'Dalits' here refer to those occupational caste groups who have 
traditionally been considered 'untouchables'. 
10 In the villages, rumors about the super-human natures of Jvlao-
ist fighters abounded. The rumors persisted even a fter many vil-
lagers had come in contact with actual Maoist cadres who looked 
exact ly like ordinary Nepalis. Most often, eye-witness accounts of a 
given 'action' (an attack on a bank for example) would describe how 
some of the Maoists were taller and bigger than any Nepali anyone 
had ever seen. 
11 A major festival and national holiday in autumn. 
12 Prachanda was later named the Chairman of NCP (Maoist) at 
its Second National Conference in February, 2001. 
13 For a useful discussion of the often mutually contradictory 
characteristics of the modern notion of emancipation, including the 
demands for radical dichotomy, holism, transparency, rationality 
and authenticity, see Laclau (1996). 
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